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RECENT CASE NOTES
It is submitted that the doctrine of the Cox case seems to have been
extended beyond its logical and reasonable limits in applying it to the
Knapp case; the rule, though proper, should be limited. However, even
though the holding of the court in the latter case refusing to consider the
statute of waiver of arraignment and pleading should prove to be an
erroneous application of the rule, nevertheless, under the facts in that case,
and considering the statute involved, there was no substantial or prejudicial
error to the rights of the appellant. In the first place, appellant in his
motion for new trial did not assign as grounds therefor "irregularities in
the proceedings of the court and jury * * " as provided in Sec. 2325,
(1). Further, there should be no question as to the constitutionality of
Sec. 2232, supra, since such regulation of procedure has always been held to
be due process of law, and further, by entering upon trial without objection,
presenting a defense, and following through the entire trial, the defendant
should be estopped from asserting that no issue had been formed by the
failure to arraign and plead, and that he was not informed of the character
of the charge against him. Although the constitutionality of the statute
has not been directly attacked, yet it has been frequently applied since its
enactment with no serious questions as to its validity.3 7 Consequently, the
same result would have been reached had the constitutionality of the statute
been considered, and under the facts in this case, at any rate, the discussion
is of a purely academic question. A failure to recognize the rule, its
reasons and limitations, might, however, under other facts, bring about a
different result, and prejudice the rights of a defendant. P. C. R.
OFFicns-ToRT LiAmirry-MINisnmLAL DuTY-Action to recover prop-
erty damages. The appellants, who were state entomologists and engaged
in the eradication of the corn borer, plowed the appellee's oat field to cover
over old cornstalks and other refuse, which the appellee had failed to dis-
pose of when so ordered. The plowing was done at a time when the soil
was over saturated with moisture, and the crop of oats were eight inches in
height, causing injury to the fertility of the soil and destroying the crop
of oats. There was no evidence of any traces of the corn borer in the ap-
pellee's field, or within the immediate vicinity. The jury found the plowing
unwarranted and unreasonable, and held the appellants liable for the dam-
age. The appellants contend that as officers of the state, acting under
authority from the conservation department, they are not personally liable
for injuries sustained as a result of their acts. Held, public officers are
personally liable for the wrongful performance of their ministerial duties.'
The principal case presents the question as to what extent a public
office affords protection from personal liability, in the performance of min-
isterial duties. A ministerial duty is absolute, certain and imperative, in-
volving the mere execution of a designated task, the law prescribing the
mode of performance so that very little, if any, discretion remains in the
officer. 2 Duties and acts which the courts have held to be ministerial are:
dipping for the eradication of the cattle tick;3 levying of a tax by a board
sTokas v. State (1930), 202 Ind. 259, 173 N. E. 453; Lee v. State (1929), 90
Ind. App. 43, 167 N. E. 543.
1 Wallace v. Feehan, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 3, 1932, 181 N. E. 862.
2Roberta v. United States (1899), 176 U. S. 221, 20 Sup. Ct. 376.
aMclellan v. Carter (1923), 30 Ga. App. 150, 117 S. E. 118.
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of supervisors after such has been ordered; 4 committance to jail by the
jailor; 5 docketing a judgment;6 signing a license.7
A public officer is personally liable in tort for injuries to an individual
resulting from non-feasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the improper
performance of a ministerial duty.8 The fact that the officer acted honestly
and without malice or corrupt motive, believing that his action was proper,
is no defense to a tort action.9 The officer's powers and duties are set out
definitely, and in the case of his ministerial duties his authority is so limited
by such that he acts at his peril outside of such. Where the officer acts
under an unconstitutional statute, -which if valid would have given him
authority for the act, he is protected from personal liability for proper
action until the statute has been declared unconstitutional.1O An officer
acting under a process that is valid upon its face is not personally liable
for his acts if such process proves to be void."1 But where the officer acts
under a process which is invalid upon its face he is wholly without his
authority and acts at his peril, being liable for any injury to an indi-
vidual.12 Where an officer carries out orders of a superior, which are un-
warrantable by law and issued without authority, he is liable personally for
the injuries sustained by third persons.13 It can be said that in any case
where a public officer exceeds his authority, then his office affords him no
protection, and he is in the same position as any private individual and
must answer personally for any wrongful or tertious acts.14
In the principal case the ministerial duty of covering over refuse was
performed in an improper manner. There were no circumstances present
that called for the use of such drastic tactics since there was no present
danger from the corn borer in the appellee's field. The action was unwar-
ranted and unreasonable and in excess of the appellants' authority in
eradicating the corn borer. It is submitted that the principal case is in
accord with the majority of the cases, in that it holds an officer personally
liable for the improper performance of a ministerial duty. A. C. J.
'Amy v. Supervisors (1870), 11 Wall. (U. S.) 136, 30 L. Ed. 101.
'Clark v. Kelly (1926), 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S. E. 365.
1lich-ard v. Tynes (1931), 149 Okla. 235, 300 Pac. 297.
1 Grider v. Tally (1884), 77 Ala. 422, 54 A. R. 65.
BJohnaon v. Lankford (1918), 245 U. S. 541, 28 Sup. Ct. 203; Frank v. Eaton
(1928), 281 N. Y. S. 477; Florio v. Schmolze (1925), 101 N. J. L. 335, 129 Atl. 470;
Raynsford v. Phelps (1880), 43 Mich. 342, 5 N. W. 403; Stevens v. North States
Motors (1928); 161 Minn. 345, 201 N. W. 435; Richard v. Tynes (1931), 149 Okla.
235. 300 Pac. 297; Clark v. Kelly (1926), 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S. E. 365; Grider v.
Tally (1884), 77 Ala. 422, 54 A. R. 65; McClellan v. Carter (1923), 30 Ga. App.
150, 117 S. E. 118.
'Amy v. Supervisors (1870), 11 Wall. (U. S.) 136. 30 L. Ed. 101; Clark v.
Kelly (1926), 101 W. Va. 650, 133 S. E. 365.
"Henke v. McCord (1880), 55 Ia. 378, 7 N. W. 623; "Effect of an Unconstitu-
tional Statute," 0. P. Field, 1 Ind. L. J. 1 (1926) ; "Protection of Officers Who Act
Under an Unconstitutional Statute," Al. P. Rapacz, 11 Minn. Law Rev. 585 (1927).
tCurtiss v. 'Witt (1896), 110 Mich. 131, 67 N. W. 1106; Erkins v. Hohnbach
(1871), 14 Wall. (U. S.) 613, 20 L. Ed. 745; Ingraham. v. Booten (1912), 117 Minn.
105, 134 N. W. 505; Chegara.y v. Jenkins (1851), 5 N. Y. 376; Underwood v. Rob-
inson (1867), 106 Mass. 296; People v. Zimmer (1911), 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529.
1 Chegaray v. Jenkins (1851). 5 N. Y. 376; Commonwealth v. Martin (1870),
105 Mass. 178; Chruscicki v. Hinrichs (1928), 197 Wis. 78, 221 N. W. 394.
ILittle v. Barreme (1804), 2 Cranch (U. S.) 170, 2 L. Ed. 243.
14 Overmeyer v. Barnett (1919), 70 Ind. App. 569, 123 N. E. 654; Warr v. Hodges
(1920), 234 Mass. 279, 125 N. E. 557; Underwood v. Green (1870), 42 N. Y. 140;
Downs v. Lazelle (1926), 102 W. Va. 663, 136 S. E. 195.
